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Upshot: I reinforce the idea of broad connections between cybernetics, design 
and science that become apparent when the messy processes implicit in each 
are reflected on more explicitly. In so doing, I treat design not as a field in which 
cybernetic ideas are to be applied, but one in which they are reflected on and 
pursued. 
1. I wish to thank all the commentators for their stimulating contributions, which 
cover a range of ground that indicates the wide potential of the relation between 
cybernetics and design research to inform both fields. It is significant that many of the 
aspects raised by commenters are focused on core topics of cybernetic research: 
computing technology (Mateus van Stralen; Christiane Herr); cognition (Andrea 
Jelić); and, broadly, the relationship between research/theory and action/practice, which 
is a focus of Herr and Michael Hohl, and underlies the concerns of Jose Cabral, Dai 
Griffiths and Tom Scholte. As Karl Müller (2010) has noted, there is a need to focus 
on core topics in order to reinforce the coherence of radical constructivism (RC) and 
second-order cybernetics (SOC) as a research field. Müller’s remarks could be taken as 
a call for a turn away from topics such as design that have been prominent in recent 
cybernetics. These commentaries, and the research to which they point, suggest that 
design may instead offer a focus in which a number of such core issues can be explored. 
2. In this context, Scholte’s introduction to the work of Ann and Lawrence Halprin 
may be valuable even beyond the project of connecting cybernetics-inspired discussions 
in design and theatre studies (see also Scholte’s target article in this issue). Building 
connections such as this would seem to be a way to help broaden the relationship of 
cybernetics with both design and theatre beyond one of application, releasing their 
potential to explore central cybernetic concerns through practice (cf. Müller 2010: 36f). 
3. Of the commentaries, those of Griffiths and Cabral put forward the most explicit 
questions, and I therefore concentrate on these below. In line with my approach in the 
target article, I have attempted to remain focused primarily on how issues raised in 
design can contribute to questions in cybernetics. 
Ill-defined problems 
4. Griffiths (§8) suggests that the account of design that I have given applies to a 
particular subset of design, whereas at least some other areas of design deal with well-
defined problems. Some design tasks or components of design tasks are, indeed, 
characterised by more constrained problems than others. Yet even apparently clear and 
familiar design tasks regularly involve incomplete criteria or contestable premises, and 
a clearly-defined goal is no guarantee of a well-defined problem (cf. Griffiths §6).  This 
is because design is always concerned with the new (target article §8), which is the case 
even when designers are not attempting to be especially innovative (that is, when we 
design a building, we are concerned with creating something new even when we stick to 
an established typology). This can be seen within the scope of the definition that 
Griffiths (§5) cites: the process of preparing a plan for constructing something is not 
solely a matter of setting out production information (the working drawings and 
specifications that will guide manufacture) but of devising what is proposed in these. 
This process involves forms of reflective, conversational activity whenever such a plan 
is considered in more than arbitrary terms (that is to say, when it is designed). 
5. Take, for instance, some of the questions posed in the design of a new motorway 
(an example within the compass of engineering, and one to which Horst Rittel and 
Melvin Webber refer, Rittel & Webber 1973: 163). Different configurations of road 
junctions will be both better and worse according to different terms of reference. Even 
considering only the efficiency of traffic flow, there will be trade offs between 
congestion at different points in the road system. There are also many other relevant 
criteria, such as, for instance: safety, other road users, cost, construction sequencing, 
maintenance, noise pollution, air quality and impact on natural habitats. While these 
criteria are mostly easily recognisable, they are not all commensurable with each other, 
such that there is no one way to resolve definitively between them, nor is it possible to 
optimise against an overall goal without this being distorting. Further, the interactions 
between these different criteria and the limitations they set on each other in the specific 
situation that is at hand only become clear as particular solutions are developed, 
discussed and enacted. Taking a broader scope, one might also challenge the premises 
under which the project is advanced: having explored the likely consequences of the 
new motorway, we may take a different view on whether it is a worthwhile project and 
consider alternative options instead. 
6. While such situations resist exhaustive analysis and conventional linear problem 
solving, designers deal with them as a matter of course and without regarding them as 
being problematic. In so doing, they develop and refine not just their design proposals 
but also the questions to which these proposals respond. Indeed, as Nigel Cross (2007: 
100) points out, designers treat even well-formed problems as if they are ill-defined, an 
approach that has the benefits of testing the assumptions that are given at the outset and 
searching for new opportunities. 
7. Griffiths (§6) gives two counter examples – those of scientific and musical 
instruments – where questions are very tightly constrained. Indeed, these situations are 
so constrained that they might well not be considered as instances of design activity in 
that they respond to a plan rather than create one. The musical instrument example, 
which is perhaps better understood in terms of craft, is closely related to the existing 
tradition of musical performance in which each instrument must be usable. These 
constraints can, however, be understood as a result of a wider design process, one where 
the configuration of the musical instrument has co-evolved slowly over several 
generations together with the traditions of musical performance to which they are 
related (this is comparable in architecture to the development of a vernacular tradition). 
The development of scientific instruments can be thought of, similarly, as blurring with 
that of scientific experimentation itself, as is reflected in accounts of scientific practice 
(target article §10). What is learnt in experiments using the instruments generates new 
criteria for further experiments and so new or refined instruments. Thus we can think of 
this as one overall process, which we could characterise either in terms of science or 
design, encompassing scientific experimentation and the construction of the instruments 
that support this. 
8. Griffiths (§8) asks the question of to what extent an SOC account of design can be 
convincing to those that do not share its epistemological position. I do not see this as a 
question of different design epistemologies but of different degrees of explicitness 
about the epistemology that is acted out in design, and different ways of making this 
explicit. What designers do in practice is not always what they describe themselves as 
doing, as discussed by Herr and Hohl. It is in retrospect that the paths taken seem clear 
and, as it is this clarity that is what designers need to communicate, the messy process 
by which this clarity is developed usually remains unremarked on. Making these sorts 
of processes explicit is a core concern of design research and something to which SOC 
can contribute. The purpose of this is not, as I see it, to reconfigure design practice in 
some specific way. Rather, articulating what would otherwise remain tacit helps 
maintain what is already special about design (including attitudes towards values, as 
raised by both Herr §2 and Hohl §§7f), something that can otherwise become lost.  
9. This relation of SOC to design practice in terms of making the implicit explicit 
may, as Griffiths (§8) suggests, inform how SOC might be advanced more generally. 
Cybernetic processes are implicit in everyday life and, as with design, making these 
processes explicit reinforces what is special about them, which can otherwise become 
lost in the context of other concerns. Looked at in these terms, SOC’s relation to 
practice is not limited to where its epistemological position is explicitly shared. It can 
enjoy a broad relation to practice in terms of implicitly cybernetic processes, while still 
contesting the ways in which particular practices are conventionally understood.  
Material agency and viability 
10. Griffiths points out tensions between RC and Andrew Pickering’s (1995) account 
of material agency. As Griffiths (§11) notes, there is not necessarily a conflict here and 
it seems to me that such tensions can be defused, or at least sharpened to more precisely 
the points at issue.  
11. This is supported by the case of design, which while constructivist in orientation is 
compatible with ideas of material agency, even if this was not emphasised in my 
account. This is both in terms of the media with which designers think and the 
technologies and industries with and in which they work: 
• Media plays an active role in how designers work. It is important to how they 
deal with complexity (Gedenryd 1998), model the material and spatial (Sweeting 
2011), and construct new possibilities (the process of sketching that Ranulph 
Glanville 2006, 2007 emphasises is one that needs to be embodied in media of 
some kind). This includes the digital technologies, as discussed by van Stralen, 
as well as the more obvious materiality of the analogue. Accounts of the active 
role of instruments in science, such as that given by Pickering (1995), can be 
read as if referring to the design studio (target article §10). 
• What is materially and technologically feasible is a crucial constraint on what 
designers propose. This is especially the case where designers try to use 
materials in forms to which they are particularly suited, as can be summarised 
by architect Louis Kahn’s oft-quoted conversation with a brick – “You say to a 
brick, ‘What do you want, brick?’ And brick says to you, ‘I like an arch.’ And 
you say to brick, ‘Look, I want one, too, but arches are expensive and I can use a 
concrete lintel.’ And then you say: ‘What do you think of that, brick?’ Brick 
says: ‘I like an arch’.”1 As well as this material-focused approach, material 
agency can be seen in the way that technological changes have transformed the 
nature of material constraints (discussed by van Stralen §§2, 4), and it remains 
an important factor even where design approaches are focused elsewhere. 
12. The principle move in RC is to change the orientation of epistemology from a 
concern with how we know (or do not know) about any real world beyond our 
experience, to a focus on this experience itself. This relocates epistemology to the realm 
of experience, in which (our experience of) the material is important to include (as is 
evident in design). While, therefore, RC can be contrasted with the material where this 
is meant in the sense of the real, there is no conflict between RC and our material 
experience. Indeed, the latter can be encompassed in the notion of viability, which is 
central to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s account. RC is not a licence for unconstrained 
construction. Von Glasersfeld (1990) gives the example of not being able to walk 
through a desk, and thus being unable to maintain a viable idea of the world that would 
allow him to do this. This is an example of a material condition in which we experience 
epistemological, not just practical, resistance. 
13. Von Glasersfeld sometimes referred to viability in terms of “fit”. In RC, this is in 
the sense of “fitting with” or evolutionary fit, and so perhaps better phrased in terms of 
the elimination of the unfit. There is no sense of correspondence to the real and much 
room for contradictory explanations to be viable in our experience at different times. 
This is not to be confused with the athlete’s notion of fit, of an idea becoming fitter and 
fitter in the sense of a closer match to the goal of the real. In this latter view, while it 
may still be acknowledged that we do not have access to the real, our experience is 
claimed to be a good guide to it in any case because of the constraints that are imposed 
on it, thus returning to a correspondence view of epistemology. The main point at issue 
here is, as I see it, not about material agency per se but whether this is understood in 
terms of the real or in the realm of experience, and about how this is then put to work 
epistemologically.  
                                                
1 https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/feb/26/louis-kahn-brick-whisperer-
architect 
14. Similarly to what I have said above regarding the relation between SOC and 
design, I think that RC is agile enough to engage with the material and the performative 
across the “whole range of scientific and design activities” (Griffiths §9), while also 
contesting what is at stake epistemologically in these. Indeed, RC can help provide the 
honesty that Glanville (2014) suggests will efface the differences between different 
research traditions (target article §14; and as expanded on by Hohl). 
Designing systems 
15. Cabral’s call for an increased focus on the systemic nature of objects is something 
that I support. The issue as I see it, and as Cabral (§3) points to, comes back to what, 
especially in architecture, is a surprising gulf between theories regarding how we 
understand, on the one hand, what is designed and, on the other, the process through 
which design occurs. Recent work has addressed this in part by seeing architecture in 
terms of its place within the building industry (Lloyd Thomas, Amhoff & Beech 2016). 
From the vantage point of SOC, there are further, more designerly opportunities for 
bridging between these areas. The work of Jelić is significant in this regard, establishing 
an account of architectural experience in commensurable terms to constructivist 
accounts of design practice. I have previously suggested there is potential in connecting 
conversational accounts of design with conversational accounts of architectural 
experience (Sweeting 2011), while in the context of the target article one can also 
understand particular examples such as the Fun Palace as being part of SOC enquiry not 
just resulting from it (Cabral §9; Jelić §4; Sweeting 2015a). 
16. The building of such bridges does not, however, guarantee in what manner they 
will be crossed. In making the argument in the target article – that design is a form of 
SOC even where SOC is not explicitly referenced – it was important for me to refer to 
work in design beyond figures such as Cedric Price, Nicholas Negroponte and John 
Frazer, who were explicitly influenced by cybernetic ideas. My reference to Peter 
Eisenman is not therefore intended to validate his architecture but to point to the formal 
similarities between his work and second-order science (SOS) that are of interest 
whatever we think of his proposals. Indeed, the sort of critiques put forward by Cabral 
and others, such as that of Robin Evans (1985), may inform how SOS and SOC can be 
developed: as Cabral (§8) puts it, “it is not enough to be self-reflexive and simply 
engaged to explore the full potential of being an SOC observer”. The question of how to 
design such systems is an open one, and a topic on which design research and 
cybernetics might collaborate.  
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